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year 2020. Starting at income levels of the year 2000, this would require a growth rate of 7.2 percent
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Why China Is Likely to Achieve Its Growth Objectives 
 
In  2002,  the  Chinese  Communist  Party  announced  a  goal  of  quadrupling  per  capita 
income by the year 2020.  Starting at income levels of the year 2000, this would require a growth 
rate of 7.2 percent per annum in per capita income or close to 8.0 percent in GDP (M. Wang 
2005). Is China likely to meet that objective? That question has been a subject of debate in Asia, 
Europe, and America, with an array of both pessimistic and optimistic views. 
In this paper I present some reasons for joining the optimists. Indeed, I will argue that 
China’s GDP is likely to grow at rates of 8 percent per annum or more for a least a generation—
that is, to 2030—and perhaps beyond that date. Before getting into substantive issues about the 
economic,  structural,  and  political  problems  that  will  have  to  be  overcome  if  the  growth 
objectives are to be met, it is useful to look at some numbers in order to set the context for 
analysis. 
Exceptionally rapid rates of growth have been achieved by several poor Asian countries 
for relatively long stretches of time since World War II. During the twenty years from 1950 to 
1970, Japan grew at an average annual rate of 8.4 percent in per capita income, increasing its per 
capita income more than sixfold, an achievement that is 50 percent higher than the goal set by 
the Chinese leadership. Over the twenty years between 1960 and 1980, Singapore’s growth in 
per capita income averaged 7.3 percent. The corresponding figure for South Korea between 1965 
and 1985 was 7.6 percent, and Taiwan-China averaged 7.2 percent over the same period. Even 
China exceeded its new growth target over the 22-year period from 1980 to 2002, when the 
achieved growth rate averaged 8.2 percent per annum (Fogel 2004b). So the target set by the 
leadership is well within the experience of the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia.   4 
However, those who question whether the new goal is achievable do so not because they 
are unaware of the past experience of nations within the region, but because they doubt that 
China will be able to replicate the experience of past leaders between now and 2020. The doubts 
arise from beliefs that unresolved or emerging economic, political, and international problems 
are likely to reduce the recent growth rate substantially. One of the economic issues is the shaky 
state of the banking system, which is saddled with a high proportion of nonperforming loans. 
The inefficiency and unprofitability of many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is also seen as a 
threat to future growth. Another problem is the growth in income disparities between the rapidly 
growing coastal provinces and the more slowly growing interior provinces, between urban and 
rural labor, and between highly skilled and manual labor (cf. Heckman 2005). There are also 
bottlenecks in infrastructure, including pressure on fuel supplies and electrical power, and the 
growth of environmental pollution. Although concern over the capacity of China to feed itself 
has diminished, concern over the adequacy of water supplies has risen. This is not an exhaustive 
list of the potential economic impediments to a continued high rate of economic growth, but it 
captures some of the main concerns.
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Although I recognize the importance of these issues, I shall not dwell on them at this 
point. I view them as issues that need to be addressed during the course of economic growth and, 
for reasons that I discuss in the second half of the paper, I believe that they will be addressed. 
They are certainly on the “to do” lists of China’s political leaders and their economic advisors, 
who stress the need for reducing social and economic imbalances. My initial focus is on more 
fundamental constraints to sustaining rapid economic growth for another generation, constraints 
that might undermine long-term growth prospects even if all the right things are done to resolve 
the current litany of problems.   5 
To  get  at  these  potentially  more  binding  constraints  it  is  useful  to  disaggregate  the 
sources of growth in per capita income between 1978 and 2002. The process is facilitated by 
equations (1) and (2) in Figure 1. Equation (1) is merely an identity which states that the level of 
per capita income is equal to output per worker multiplied by the labor force participation rate. In 
equation (1) the output of the economy is divided into three sectors: agriculture, industry, and 
services. Labor productivity in each sector is weighted by that sector’s share of the labor force. 
Equation (2) is the rate of growth transformation of equation (1). It says that the rate of growth in 
per capita income is a weighted average of the sum of the rate of change in the labor share and of 
labor productivity of each sector plus the rate of change in the labor force participation rate. The 
sectoral weights are the mid-period shares of income originating in each sector.  
Table 1 shows that 69 percent of the growth in per capita income between 1978 and 2002 
was due to increases in labor productivity within each of the three main sectors of the economy.
2 
The rise in labor productivity was most rapid in industry (6.2 percent per annum) despite the 
inefficient state-owned enterprises and the inefficiencies in the allocation of capital. As Lin and 
Tsai (2004, 355-356) have pointed out, the policy of  gradually shifting from central control 
appears to have been more effective than the “big bang” approach. By sequencing reforms that 
successively  enlarged  the  scope  of  the  market  sector,  even  the  SOEs  shifted  most  of  their 
purchases and sales to market prices rather than plan prices. 
Table 1 also shows that while changes in labor productivity were highest in the industrial 
sector, they were nearly as high in agriculture (5.7 percent in agriculture as compared to 6.2 
percent in industry). Moreover, this high rate of growth in agricultural productivity has been 
sustained for more than two decades. Table 2 shows that although China’s rate of growth in 
agricultural labor productivity over a two-decade period is not unprecedented, it is at the high   6 
end  of  experience  in  both  Asia  and  Europe.  Only  Korea  exceeded  the  Chinese  growth  in 
agricultural labor productivity between 1980 and 1997, but in contrast to China, most of the 
Korean agricultural labor force had already shifted into industry and services. In the Chinese 
case, half of the labor force is still in agriculture, so the interindustry effect might yet prove to be 
substantial. Indeed, it is likely to be somewhat larger in the next two decades than it was between 
1980 and 2000. 
Since about 30 percent of China’s growth rate is likely to continue to come from inter-
industry shifts and modest increases in the labor force participation rate (cf. Johnson 2000), 
growth rates of labor productivity within sectors need only average about 5 percent per year. 
Several factors suggest that such growth rates are likely. Despite the remarkable advances of 
recent decades, the average technology is still well below best prevailing practice in each of the 
three  sectors.  Hence,  growth  in  each  sector  will  be  stimulated  by  the  diffusion  of  the  best 
prevailing practice. Moreover, the frontier of technology is moving out rapidly, especially in the 
industrial and service sectors, but also in agriculture. Third, the investment in capital, especially 
human capital, is capable of rapid improvement in the next several decades. Finally, despite the 
preoccupation with possible overstatement of the Chinese growth rate due to inflated estimates 
of  growth  sent  from  localities,  on  balance  it  is  likely  that  the  true  Chinese  growth  rate  is 
understated,  especially  in  the  service  sector,  due  to  the  failure  adequately  to  account  for 
improvements in the quality of output and the underreporting of small firms. I now want to 
elaborate briefly on these last two factors and assess their likely impact on growth rates over the 
next two or three decades. 
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The Role of Factor Enhancement 
Table 3 presents enrollment ratios in primary, secondary, and tertiary schools for 1980, 
1990, 1997, and 2000. China is compared with seven Asian nations, four Western European 
nations, and the United States. At the primary level, China’s ratios exceed those of all the other 
nations.  At the secondary level China compares favorably with the other newly industrializing 
countries (NICs), but it is behind South Korea, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. 
However, the gap diminished rapidly between 1990 and 1997. In this brief span the enrollment 
ratio at the secondary level increased by over 40 percent. China lags furthest behind the rich 
nations  at  the  tertiary  level.  There  its  enrollment  level  is  between  15  and  27  percent  of 
enrollment levels in Korea, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. However, once again 
it  is  rapidly  closing  the  gap.  Between  1990  and  2004  the  Chinese  tertiary  enrollment  ratio 
sextupled (China Statistical Yearbook 2005). 
It is possible to quantify the impact of enhancing the quality of labor through education 
on the growth rate of per capita income by making use of the equations shown in Figure 2. 
Equation (3) is a factor-augmenting production function in which  L g  and  K g  are indexes of labor 
and capital augmentation (in this discussion I will focus only on labor augmentation). Equation 
(4) merely rearranges equation (3) to put it in a more convenient form. The dependent variable is 
now labor productivity and the term in square brackets brings the augmentation indexes together 
with the index of total factor productivity. Equation (5) is the rate of growth transformation of 
equation (4). It indicates that when all other variables are held constant, labor productivity will 
grow at the rate of growth of labor augmentation multiplied by labor’s share in income.    8 
Table 4 presents the information needed to implement equation (5). The top part presents 
an index of the relative productivity of labor with primary, high school, and college degrees. The 
index  is  based  on  the  income  of  U.S.  males  by  education  level.  It  indicates  that  a  college-
educated worker is 3.1 times as productive, and a high school graduate is 1.8 times as productive, 
as a worker with less than a ninth-grade education.
3 The bottom half of the table indicates the 
contribution of various scenarios of increases in enrollment ratios. Labor enhancement would 
grow at the rate of 1.8 percent per annum if the secondary ratio reached one hundred in 20 years. 
Multiplying this figure by the labor share indicates that such an achievement would add about 
1.1 percent to the growth rate of labor productivity. 
Labor enhancement would grow at 7.4 percent per annum if the tertiary ratio rose from 6 
to 25 in the next twenty years, which would put the tertiary level of education in China at about 
where the Western European nations were in 1980. That level of labor augmentation would add 
4.4 percent to the growth rate of labor productivity, and by itself would account for over 60 
percent of the target set in 2002. With a more ambitious expansion of higher education, reaching 
enrollment ratios of 50 in 20 years, labor augmentation would grow at 11.2 percent. The rate of 
investment in human capital would by itself add 6.7 percent to the overall growth rate.  
These targets for higher education are not out of reach. It should be remembered that as 
recently as 1980, the Western European nations had ratios of about 25. Only the United States 
was above 50. The movement to enrollment ratios of 50 in Western Europe was a product of the 
last two decades of the twentieth century. In the case of the U.K., two-thirds of the increase from 
19 to 52 percent took place between 1990 and 1997. 
The significance of investment in human capital as an engine of economic growth has not 
eluded the State Council.  In 1998 Jiang Zemin called for a massive increase in enrollments in   9 
higher  education.  The  response  was  swift:  over  the  next  four  years  enrollment  in  higher 
education increased by 165 percent (from 3.4 million to 9.0 million) and the number of students 
studying  abroad  also  rose  by  152  percent  (China  Statistical  Yearbook  2003).  It  is  currently 
estimated that by 2010 at least 20 percent of high school graduates will be enrolled in institutions 
of higher education and the long run target is 50 percent by 2050. The tertiary enrollment ratio 
increased  by  about  50  percent  between  2000  and  2004  (from  12.5  to  19.0  percent),  so  the 
calculations shown in Table 4 may well be too conservative (China Statistical Yearbook 2005). 
China  currently  has  about  20  million  students  enrolled  in  higher  education,  which  exceeds 
current U.S. enrollments by about 60 percent. (Newcomb 2005; U.S. Statistical Abstract 2005). 
It is estimated that in 2005-6 China will produce 3.3 million college graduates, India 3.1 million, 
and the United States 1.3 million (Colvin 2005). However, in advancing the frontier of scientific 
training, the United States still has a considerable lead. 
Errors in the Measurement of Output 
So far I have focused mainly on factor enhancement to support my contention that China 
is likely to achieve its growth targets. I want to turn now to the problems of measurement on the 
output side of equation (5). Errors in the measurement of national income from the output side 
have become increasingly severe. It is now clear that official estimates of GDP for the United 
States  badly  underestimate  U.S.  economic  growth  because  they  do  not  take  into  account 
improvements in the quality of output, especially in such services as education and health care. 
Children in secondary schools are taught more about science and technology today than post-
graduate college students used to be taught a generation ago, let alone two generations ago. 
Even  more  dramatic  are  the  improvements  in  health  care.  A  century  and  a half  ago, 
people in their late thirties and early forties were more afflicted by  chronic disabilities than   10 
people in their late sixties and early seventies are today. Not only has the average age at onset of 
disabilities been delayed by a decade or so, but once disabilities appear, there are now numerous 
effective interventions. Hernias, which used to be permanent and exceedingly painful conditions 
afflicting one out of every four males, can now be repaired by a surgical procedure that in the 
United States requires hospitalization for only 23 hours. Other areas where medical interventions 
have  been  highly  effective  include  treatment  of  genito-urinary  conditions,  control  of 
hypertension and reduction in the incidence of stroke, replacement of knee and hip joints, curing 
of cataracts, and  chemotherapies that reduce the incidence of osteoporosis and heart disease 
(Fogel 2004a). 
  Yet most of these great advances in health care and education are overlooked in the GDP 
accounts, because the values of these sectors are measured by inputs instead of by output. An 
hour of a doctor's time is considered no more effective today than an hour of a doctor's time was 
half  a  century  ago,  before  the  age  of  antibiotics  and  modern  surgery.  It  has  recently  been 
estimated that the value of improvements in health care, if properly measured, are at least twice 
the cost of health care, but such calculations have not yet made their way into the GDP accounts 
(Cutler and McClellan 2001; Murphy and Topel 2003; Nordhaus 2003). In the case of the United 
States, my own rough estimates indicate that allowing for such factors as the increase in leisure 
time, the improvement in the quality of health care, and the improvements in the quality of 
education would come close to doubling the U.S. annual growth rate of per capita income over 
the past century (from 2.0 to 3.6 percent per annum). 
  What is the implication of these statistics for understanding the change in standards of 
living for the typical American? If we use the conventional measure of growth, the real income 
of the typical American in 2000 was 7 times greater than it was in 1900. However, if an adjusted   11 
measure is used, Americans in 2000 had real incomes that were 34 times greater than in 1900. In 
other words, 80 percent of the goods and services that Americans enjoy today are outside of the 
measured economy (Fogel 2000 and 2004a). 
  What is the implication of the failure to take account of improvements in the quality of 
output for the measurement of Chinese economic growth? In China the main increases in life 
expectancy took place before the onset of the period of reform. Between 1950 and 1980, life 
expectancy at birth increased from 40.8 to 67.8 years. By 2000 life expectancy stood at about 
71.4, an increase of about 0.18 years of life expectancy per calendar year during the period of 
accelerated  economic  reform  (Keyfitz  and  Flieger  1990;  China  Statistical  Yearbook  2003). 
Studies of the value of a statistical life year in rich and poor nations suggest that the value of an 
additional year of life in China is about 3.5 times per capita income (see, e.g., Murphy and Topel 
2002;  Viscusi  and  Aldy  2003).  Hence,  the  value  of  the  unmeasured  improvements  in  life 
expectancy may have been high enough to raise the rate of economic growth between 1980 and 
2000 by about 60 percent. If the true growth of GDP between 2000 and 2040 is 13 percent 
instead of 8 percent, then the true size of the Chinese economy in 2040 will be about 6 times the 
size of the measured economy. Of course, if both the United States and China similarly neglect 
changes of quality in their measurements, the relative ranking of the two economies may not be 
changed significantly. 
Will Political Instability Undermine Economic Growth? 
So  far  I  have  focused  purely  on  economic  issues.  Some  analysts  argue  that  political 
instability is a serious impediment to China’s ability to maintain high rates of economic growth. 
Several scenarios have been outlined in which political factors could thwart economic goals. 
Some of these scenarios begin with an economic breakdown brought on by a sharp cyclical   12 
downturn that would raise unemployment and undermine a precarious social stability. Others 
warn  that  a  growing  social  unrest  has  been  brought  on  by  the  financial  problems  and 
inefficiencies of the state-owned enterprises. These problems have not only led to rising urban 
unemployment but have also resulted in the failure to pay promised wages, pensions, health-care 
allowances, and housing allowances (Bremmer 2005; Chaohua 2005). Still others warn of an 
impending breakdown in the banking system, which is beset by a huge burden of nonperforming 
loans, a breakdown that could undermine the microeconomic stability of the economy (Garnaut 
and Song 2004). 
Other threats to stability that have been observed include: widespread corruption; internal 
power struggles; bubbles in real estate, international trade, and steel (among other products); 
inequality between the urban and rural areas, between the coastal and interior provinces, between 
the highly educated elites and poorly educated masses, and between the Han majority and the 
ethnic minorities. One unique warning singles out the sharp rise in the sex ratio concentrated at 
ages 15–34, which, it is argued, will translate into high rates of crime and violence and may 
promote concubinage. Some single out international tensions, particularly over Taiwan, which 
divert the attention of the leadership from their growth objectives (Pei 2005; Bradsher 2004; 
Dunphy 2004, Hu 2000; Lim 2004; Business Asia 2002; McGregor 2004; Wilson 2004; EIU 
ViewsWire 2004). 
When speculating about the future, the range of possible scenarios is virtually unlimited. 
The point at issue is not what might occur, but what is likely to occur. Moreover, many of the 
problems  singled  out  are  of  long  standing,  such  as  the  inefficiency  of  many  state-owned 
enterprises. While these SOEs may be a drag on the economy, China has nevertheless been able 
to grow at over 8 percent per capita for a quarter of a century. The idea that these inefficient   13 
firms will suddenly  go  bankrupt is far-fetched.  The policy of the State Council has been to 
gradually phase them out or to reorganize them on a profitable basis so as not to sharply increase 
unemployment. Not only does the government have the finances needed to continue subsidizing 
inefficient firms if it chooses to do so for economic or political reasons, but the burden of these 
subsidies will also gradually diminish, because the share of the industrial output supplied by 
these underperforming SOEs will gradually decline and the burden of a given level of subsidies 
will rapidly diminish with the economy growing so rapidly. 
These points also apply to the problem of the state banks. Although the proportion of 
nonperforming loans may be about 35 percent, China is not in immediate danger of a collapse of 
its banking system. It is within the power of the government to remove this burden. The banks 
originally  became  saddled  with  the  bad  paper  because  the  government  obliged  the  banks  to 
finance  unprofitable  SOEs.  The  inefficiencies  and  distortions  in  the  economy  produced  by 
banking  policies  have  been  relieved  by  the  large  injection  of  foreign  direct  investment, 
encouraged  by  government  policy,  which  has  also  facilitated  the  transfer  of  advanced 
technologies to China. With direct investment going largely into large-scale industry, the banks 
have been able to supply part of the capital needed by small-scale enterprises (Lin, Cai, and Li 
2003; Fan 2005). Movements in the direction of more effectively using the monetary system to 
manage  business  cycles,  and  contemplated  reforms  in  capital  markets,  should  also  alleviate 
economic distortions. For example, the government recently restructured two of the four largest 
state-owned banks to bring their capital position up to international standards. Most important, 
perhaps, is the very low level of government indebtedness (less than a fifth of GDP), which gives 
the State Council leeway to pursue needed stabilization policies, including a rapid restructuring   14 
of the banking system, instead of the gradual policy of reform it is currently pursuing (Lin, Cai, 
and Li 2003; Fan 2005). 
Although  there  are  disagreements  about  economic  policy  among  the  top  leaders,  the 
proposition that China should continue to transform itself into a market economy is not at issue. 
Nor  is  there  disagreement  over  the  policy  of  promoting  increasing  autonomy  in  economic 
decisions  as  a  lever  of  rapid  economic  growth.  As  many  analysts  have  pointed  out,  the 
government is unified around a policy that has been called “market preserving federalism.” This 
Chinese  form  of  federalism  limits  the  central  government’s  control  over  economic  decision 
making, promotes creative competition among local governments, constrains rent seeking, and 
provides an array of incentives to induce creative local enterprises. This type of federalism is 
also apparent in the design of the tax system, which has been called “fiscal federalism,” and 
which is aimed at preventing taxation from stifling economic growth. In the tax reform of 1994, 
the central government limited its primary administration to VAT and taxes on centrally owned 
enterprises. It also set up local tax bureaus under the direction of local governments to supervise 
income taxes. While much remains to be done in the design of the fiscal system, especially with 
respect to narrowing regional inequalities, these issues are on the leadership’s agenda of needed 
reforms. The central leadership is also aware of the danger that local autonomy may move in 
counterproductive ways that promote rent seeking, moral hazard, and other forms of corruption, 
and that it must monitor performance and penalize corruption where possible. The successful 
unfolding of autonomy requires a center strong enough to integrate national and local goals, to 
discipline  local  authorities  whose  corrupt  practices  threaten  the  progress  of  reform,  and  to 
provide rewards to those who advance it (Lin, Cai, and Li 2003; Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez   15 
2003;  Blanchard  and  Shleifer  2000;  Montinola,  Qian,  and  Weingast  1996;  Krug,  Zhu,  and 
Hendrischke 2003). 
Some  analysts  argue  that  unless  China  permits  competing  political  parties,  powerful 
pressures  will  build  up  between  the  provinces  and  the  center  that  will  undermine  political 
stability and thwart continued high rates of economic growth. Others argue that the unsolved 
inequalities have also built up pressures at the grass roots that threaten to become unmanageable 
(Goldstone  1995;  Ohman  1995;  Esarey  2002).  Other  issues  stressed  by  analysts  include 
mounting environmental hazards, lagging development of public health programs, and endemic 
corruption (Shambaugh 2000; Chapman 2002). 
The difficulty with these arguments is that they assume that the leaders of the CCP and 
the  State  Council  are  unaware  of  these  problems.  The  leaders  are  quite  well  aware  that  the 
successes of their growth policies have weakened the central government’s control over daily life 
and access to information. Indeed, one purpose of the reforms was to promote creativity at the 
local level by promoting local initiative and by encouraging the entry of global firms into the 
Chinese market in order to facilitate new ideas and technologies. Moreover, critiques of current 
policies that hamper economic growth are encouraged, although competitive political parties are 
prohibited. Debates over governmental policies at all levels are as vigorous and wide-ranging at 
the  meetings  of  the  Chinese  Economists  Society  as  they  are  at  the  American  Economic 
Association.  
The leaders of the CCP have responded to the changing economic and social conditions 
by changing the central goal of the CCP and by co-opting the elites who are at the forefront of 
China’s economic and social transformation. This process of adaptation is reflected in the new 
slogan of the CCP, “Three Represents,” introduced by Jiang Zemin in the spring of 2000 to   16 
replace the previous slogan of “Three Revolutionary Classes” (peasants, workers, and soldiers). 
The new slogan portrays the CCP as: (1) the embodiment of society’s most advanced productive 
forces; (2) the promoter of an advanced culture; and (3) representing the needs and interests of 
the great majority of the Chinese population. To extend its connections with the elites who are 
bringing about the transformation of China, the CCP encouraged the formation of a wide array of 
new business and professional societies with strong ties to the state.  It also transformed the 
membership of the CCP, bringing into its fold the technocratic leaders of business, social, and 
intellectual  life.  During  the  two  decades  following  1982,  the  proportion  of  the  Central 
Committee  members  holding  college  degrees  increased  from  a  little  over  half  to  nearly  99 
percent (Dickson 2003a and b). 
The 16
th Congress of the CCP, which met in November 2002, made provincial leaders the 
most prominent group in the Politburo, representing 42 percent of its membership. By contrast, 
the military represented only 8 percent of the Politburo, and central party institutions accounted 
for 25 percent. The balance of the Politburo membership came from Shanghai political circles or 
from institutions other than provincial leaderships or central government institutions. Given the 
dominant role of provincial leaders in the shaping of national policy, it makes little sense to 
dwell on the possibility of a conflict between the national and provincial leaders, especially when 
many of the central leaders came from provincial posts (Bo 2004). 
Some analysts argue that leaders of the CCP and the State Council are out of touch with 
public opinion. However, the weight of evidence contradicts that view. Local and provincial 
governments have been using polling techniques to determine public opinion on an array of 
economic and social issues since the late 1980s. Academic critics of government policies abound 
and interactions between these critics and top government leaders are numerous. The range of   17 
problems raised by respondents to surveys mirrors the complaints of academic critics and foreign 
analysts,  including  widespread  corruption,  increasing  inequality,  persistent  unemployment, 
burdensome taxes, and unpaid pensions. Nevertheless, the polls also reveal majority support for 
the  central  government  and  overwhelming  belief  that  the  courts,  the  press,  and  government 
institutions will be responsive to their grievances (Pei 2001; Lin et al. 2002; China Newsweek 
2005).
4 
Popular confidence in the government reflects the widespread belief among the Chinese 
that their living conditions have improved (67 percent better, 12 percent worse, 20 percent no 
change). The level of confidence about whether living conditions will continue to improve is 
similar. According to another poll, optimism about the future is slightly higher in rural areas (75 
percent) than in the cities (68 percent). Hence, it is not surprising that political reform is quite 
limited, although there is an expectation that the government will gradually improve legal and 
governmental institutions. This generally favorable view of government not only reflects the 
pragmatic responses of leaders at all levels of government to grievances, but also the frequent 
intervention of the central government with local officials when they are too slow to respond to 
complaints. It also reflects the rapid increases in income experienced by the great majority of 
households for more than a quarter of a century (Fewsmith 2003).
5 
This combination of widely shared economic advances and governmental attention to 
public  opinion,  especially  with  respect  to  grievances,  is  a  formula  for  continued  political 
stability. One indication of the stability of the regime and the self-confidence of its leaders is its 
successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Another is its encouragement of Chinese students to 
enroll  in  American  and  European  universities.  The  gradual  loosening  of  constraints  on 
expression in China is likely to continue over the next several decades. Whether or not these   18 
developments lead to a multiparty system of the American type remains to be seen.   However, 
the government’s responsiveness to popular concerns indicates that political stability is likely to 
remain at the level required for continued long-term economic growth.   
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Notes
 
1.  Discussions  of  economic  impediments  that  may  foil  the  growth  targets  of  China  are 
summarized in Shane 2005; Zakaria 2005; Morrison 2005; R. Wang 2005; Economist 
2004a, 2004b, 2005a; Prasad 2004. 
2.  The  disaggregation  shown  in  Table  1  is  based  on  data  from  the  China  Statistical 
Yearbook 2003, pp. 26, 27, 313. In the absence of a GDP deflator, the retail fixed-base 
price index was used to obtain real GDP. Because the differential approximation shown 
in equation (1) does not quite add up to 
*
Y , the sum of the terms on the right-hand side of 
the equation was used as the denominator when computing the contribution of changes in 
the LFPR, in inter-industry shifts in the labor force, and in within-sector productivity to 
the overall change in per capita income. 
3.  The relative index for other G-8 countries reporting data were somewhat different from 
those shown for the United States in Table 2, but not materially so. Their use would not 
materially change the analysis. I prefer the U.S. figures as reported in Table 2 because it 
is  likely  that  even  they  underestimate  the  impact  of  labor-augmentation  on  Chinese 
economic growth. The data reported by OECD for 6 of the G-8 countries for 1997, 1998, 
or 1999 are as follows: 
  Canada  France  Germany  Italy  UK  U.S. 
Less than 12th grade  100  100  100  100  100  100 
High-school graduate  120  119  128  172  154  149 
B.A. or higher degree  183  201  201  —  263  269 
Source: Sherman, Honegger, and McGivern 2003, Table A31. 
The values of the U.S. index in this table differ from those in Table 2 for several reasons. 
The values here are based on average income over both sexes rather than the median 
income for men only. The age range here excludes persons aged 65 and over. The years 
used here are 1997, 1998, or 1999 rather than 2000. But the most important factor is that 
the base here is less than twelfth grade rather than less than ninth grade. It should be 
noted that in Table 2, the ratio of the income of persons with college degrees to those 
with high school degrees is 173. In this note it is 181. 
4.  Other  interesting  discussions  of  political  stresses  and  responses  include  Huang  1995; 
Chapman 2002; Gong 2005; D. Wang 2005; and Bremmer 2005. 
5.  It  is  also  worth  noting  the  distinction  made  by  Fareed  Zakaria  between  liberal 
democracies, illiberal democracies, and liberalizing autocracies. Liberal democracies are 
not only marked by contested elections, but also by governments that seek to protect the 
autonomy and dignity of individuals against coercion, create  checks on the power of 
various branches of government, and establish equality under law. Illiberal democracies 
have contested elections but the elected governments use their power to repress speech 
and assembly and to restrict economic and social behavior. Liberalizing autocracies have   20 
 
one-party  systems  but  have  permitted  individuals  limited  political  rights  and  have 
improved the spheres of economic, social, and  civil rights. He argues that most East 
Asian governments today “are a mix of democracy, liberalism, capitalism, oligarchy, and 
corruption—much like Western governments circa 1900” (Zakaria 1997, 28; cf. Zakaria 








(1)  ( ) a a i i s s Y W W W r l l l = + +  
 
(2) 
* * * * * * * * ( ) ( ) ( ) a a a i i i s s s Y W W W s l s l s l r = + + + + + +  
 
where 
Y =   per capita income 
r =  the labor force participation rate 
, , a i s l l l =  the agricultural, industrial, and service shares of the labor force 
, , a i s W W W =  output per worker in agriculture, industry, and services 
*=  an asterisk over a variable indicates the growth rate of that 
variable 
, , a i s s s s =  the mid-period share of income originating in agriculture, 
industry, and services 
 




Values of Variables and Weights Used in 
Growth Decomposition for 1978–2002 
 
 
Variable or Weight  Annual Rate of Change 
1978–2000 
*
Y   8.4 
*
a l   -1.4 
*
a W   5.7 
*
i l   0.9 
*
i W   6.2 
*
s l   3.6 
*
s W   4.5 
*
r   1.3 
a s   0.218 
i s   0.496 
s s   0.286 




Annual Rates of Growth in Agricultural Labor Productivity (in Percent) 
 
Country  Period  Growth Rate 
India
a  1980–1997  2.3 
Indonesia
a  1980–1997  1.7 
Japan
a  1980–1997  4.1 
Korea (South)
a  1980–1997  6.8 
Malaysia
a  1980–1997  3.7 
Taiwan-China
d  1985–2003  3.9 
Thailand
a  1980–1997  2.3 
     
France
a  1980–1997  5.5 
Germany
a  1980–2000  — 
Italy
b  1980–2000  5.2 
United Kingdom
b  1980–2000  3.4 
United States
c  1958–1996  3.2 
 
Sources: (a) World Development Report 2000/2001, Table 8. 
  (b) World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(https://publications.worldbank.org/subscriptions/WDI) 
  (c) Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000, Table 2 
  (d) Asian Development Bank 2004. 
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TABLE 3 
 
Gross Enrollment Ratios 
 
  
Primary School  Secondary School  Tertiary School  




China   113  125  123  114  46  49  70  68  2  3  6  13  7–15 
Hong 
Kong  
107 102 94  109  64  80 73  78  10  19  22  25  — 
Indonesia  107 115 113  110  29  44 56  57  4  9  11  15  7–15 
Korea 
(South) 
110 105 94  101  78  90 102  94  15  39  68  78  6–15 
Malaysia   94 94 101  98  48  56 64  70  4  7  12  28  — 
Thailand   99 99 87  95  29  30 56  82  15  19  22  35  6–14 
India   83 97 100  —  30  44 49  —  5  6  7  —  6–14 
Japan   101 100 101  101  93  97 103  102  31  30  41  48  6–15 
France   111 108 105  105  85  99 111  108  25  40  51  54  6–16 
Germany  — 101 104  104  —  98 104  104  27  34  47  —  6–18 
Italy   100 103 101  101  72  83 95  96  27  32  47  50  6–14 
United 
Kingdom 
103 104 116  99  83  85 129  156  19  30  52  60  5–16 
United 
States  
99  102  102  101  91  93  97  95  56  75  81  73  6–16 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics 2004, Table 394. 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04/tables/xls/tabn394.xls 
Note: Gross enrollment ratios are equal to the total enrollment of all ages in the school level 
divided by the population of the specific ages that correspond to the specific age groups that 
correspond to the school level. Ratios may exceed 100 because of the students outside the 
relevant age range.    25 
FIGURE 2 
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(5)  ( ) ( )
* * * * * * *





Q =  output 
A =  an index of total factor productivity 
L =  the labor input 
L g =  an index of labor augmentation 
K g =  an index of capital augmentation 
*=  an asterisk indicates the growth rate of a variable 
a =  the labor share of income 
1 a - =  the capital share of income 
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TABLE 4 
 
Measuring the Likely Impact of Labor Augmentation through Secondary and Higher 
Education on the Growth Rate of Per Capita Income 
 
 
Index of the Relative Productivity of Different Educational Endowments  Index 
Less than ninth  100 
High school graduate  179 
Bachelor’s or higher degree  310 
 
 
Estimated values for 
 
a   0.6 
*
2 L g  if secondary enrollment ratios reach 100 in 20 years (%)  1.8 
*
3 L g  if tertiary enrollment ratios reach 25 in 20 years (%)  7.4 
*
3 L g  if tertiary enrollment ratios reach 50 in 20 years (%)  11.2 
 
a is from Young 2000, Table XXIII. Index values are computed from median U.S. 
income by educational attainment (U.S. Department of Education, National Center 
for Education Statistics 2001, Table 383. http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/ d01/ 
dt383.asp).   27 
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